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incriminating evidence?: a forensic analysis of
residual artifacts from private and portable web
browsing sessions
Donny J Ohana* and Narasimha ShashidharAbstract
The Internet is an essential tool for everyday tasks. Aside from common use, the option to browse the Internet
privately is a desirable attribute. However, this can create a problem when private Internet sessions become hidden
from computer forensic investigators in need of evidence. Our primary focus in this research is to discover residual
artifacts from private and portable web browsing sessions. In addition, the artifacts must contain more than just file
fragments and enough to establish an affirmative link between user and session. Certain aspects of this topic have
triggered many questions, but there have never been enough authoritative answers to follow. As a result, we
propose a new methodology for analyzing private and portable web browsing artifacts. Our research will serve
to be a significant resource for law enforcement, computer forensic investigators, and the digital forensics
research community.
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RAM analysis1. Introduction
In the last 20 years, the Internet has become drastically
essential for everyday tasks associated with stationary
and mobile computer devices. Aside from common
Internet usage, people desire the option to browse the
Internet while keeping their user information private. As a
result, new web browsing features were slowly developed
for all major web browsers, asserting the option of ‘private
browsing.’ This method works by either removing
information at the end of a private session or by not
writing the data at all. Other private browser features
may include concealing additional information such
as cookie discoverability from websites.
According to one study [1] there are two private browsing
objectives. The first objective is to allow users to browse the
Internet without leaving any trace. The second is to allow
users to browse the Internet while limiting identity disco-
verability to websites. While both of these goals are* Correspondence: djo007@shsu.edu
Department of Computer Science, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville,
TX 77340, USA
© 2013 Ohana and Shashidhar; licensee Spring
Commons Attribution License (http://creativeco
reproduction in any medium, provided the origimportant, our research will focus on discovering informa-
tion from local storage devices since the majority of com-
puter investigations involve search and seizure of local
machines. One alternative to using private browsing modes
is to surf the Internet using a portable web browser, such as
one stored on a Universal Serial Bus (USB) flash drive.
Therefore, web browsing sessions are more likely to be
stored on the portable storage device itself instead of the
computer or host machine.
Private and portable web browsing artifacts, such as
usernames, electronic communication, browsing history,
images, and videos, may contain significant evidence to
an examiner. Prior research in this area is very limited.
Referring back to one of the main studies on private
browsing modes [1], this research lacks an in-depth analysis
of deleted and volatile information pertaining to private
browsing sessions. In another study focused on portable
web browsers [2], many statements were made without the
basis of true experimental findings. Furthermore, there are
virtually no published studies on residual artifacts from
current portable web browsers existing on host machines.er. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
mmons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
inal work is properly cited.
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SanDisk U3 flash drive and its portable applications. Since
U3-USB devices had a pre-installed read-only partition, it
was challenging for forensic investigators to discover
electronic evidence. In the latter year of 2009, SanDisk
began phasing out support for U3 Technology and it
has been discontinued because of many irresolvable
issues [3].
Private and portable web browsing artifacts can be
extremely valuable. Prior research either lacks significant
findings or does not provide sufficient answers. We plan
to overcome these shortcomings by analyzing both
allocated and unallocated space on entire disks while
measuring our results against multiple web browsers.
Furthermore, we plan to analyze volatile data that may be
available in an incident response.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides
a list of background terms. Section 3 describes prior
and related work in private browsing modes and portable
web browsers. Section 4 discusses the four major browsers
and their privacy capabilities. Section 5 discusses several
different portable web browsers. Section 6 details the
implementation and experiments. Sections 7 and 8 conclude
the paper with some open questions, future work, and
discussion.2. Background definitions
In this section, we provide a list of background terms
and definitions (Table 1) to assist readers with some of
the terminology used in this research.Table 1 Terms and definitions
Terminology Definition
Residual artifacts Remaining data such as files, images, d
Affirmative link Judicially devised standard to aid Cour
ISO image A computer file that is an exact copy o
Virtual machine Simulation of a real machine
Prefetch files (Windows) Each time an application is run on a W
is created to speed boot time
$I30/$MFT New Technology File System (NTFS) In
Browser cache Temporary Internet files (storage) for in
RAM Working memory that is volatile
Pagefile (paging) Virtual memory designated on disk
Memdump Action of dumping volatile memory in
Drive free space Referencing the unallocated space on
Slack space/file slack Unused space in a disk cluster (area be
System volume information Volume shadow copy (snapshots) for s
FTK orphan directory Contains files that no longer have a pa
Data carving There are many different types of data
most data carvers extract content by lo3. Related work
3.1. Private browsing
In the study [1] on private browsing modes in modern
browsers, researchers presented a list of inconsistencies
between private browsing goals and browser implementa-
tions. They also defined private browsing modes to have
two primary goals: privacy against the web and privacy
against local machines. Meaning, the user's identity should
not be identified over the Internet (web), and the user's
activity should not be recorded on the machine (local).
One example is that Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome
both take steps to remain private against websites
during private mode. Apple Safari on the other hand
takes measures to only protect against local machines,
but through our research, we will exploit some of the
vulnerability to that method.
The researchers found that all the web browsers (tested)
failed in one way or another when analyzing policies. This
is mainly because of complications introduced by browser
plug-ins and extensions. It was also shown that extensions
can weaken private browsing modes and therefore activities
can still be recorded. One example is that Google Chrome
disables all extensions during private browsing mode and
Firefox does not. With regard to inconsistencies within a
single browser, the researchers found that cookies set in
public mode in Firefox 3.6 are not available to the web
when browsing privately, however SSL certificates and
passwords are.
Ultimately, this study establishes a good foundation for
private browsing analysis but lacks significant findings.
The areas primarily studied were policy inconsistencies,ocuments, and web content
ts in determining sufficiency of evidence between subject and offense
f an existing file, CD, DVD, etc.
indows machine, a Prefetch file referencing the loaded application
dex Attribute/Master File Table
creasing speed
to a file to view contents
disk
tween end of file and end of disk cluster)
ystem restore/backup
rent, and the parent folder is overwritten (using $MFT as a reference)
carving techniques (block-based, statistical, semantic, etc.) but essentially,
oking for file headers/footers and then ‘carving’ data blocks in between
Ohana and Shashidhar EURASIP Journal on Information Security 2013, 2013:6 Page 3 of 13
http://jis.eurasipjournals.com/content/2013/1/6browser extension weaknesses, private browsing usage,
website user discoverability, and Firefox vulnerabilities.
Various files and folders which were privately modified
and accessed are pointed out by the researchers, but they
do retrieve specific data that is deleted after a private
session is terminated. Also, volatile memory artifacts were
ignored because they wanted to show discoverability after
the memory was cleared. When a small experiment was
conducted running a memory leaking program, certain
artifacts from private browsing sessions were discovered
in the memory. The reason for this was explained
that operating systems often cache DNS resolutions,
and therefore by analyzing the cache and TTL values,
an investigator can learn if and when the user visited
a particular site. In addition, the Operating System can
swap memory pages leaving further traces of user activity.
In contrast to this research, we plan to examine all
four major web browsers utilizing a different acquisition
method. Our goal is to extract as much data as possible,
including deleted and volatile data, to obtain sufficient
information within the artifacts retrieved. One research
article [4] argues that browser vendors deliver exactly
what they claim but consumers have limited knowledge as
to what private browsing modes can actually do. Comparing
this article to the first study [1] proves otherwise. There are
clearly private policy inconsistencies within the four major
browsers according to the data.
3.2. Portable web browsing
One study on portable web browsers [2] explained that
portable web browsing artifacts are primarily stored
where the installation folder is located (removable disk).
Residual artifacts, such as USB identifiers and portable
programs, can be discovered by analyzing the Windows
Registry and Windows Prefetch files. Furthermore,
they state that if the removable disk is not accessible
to the investigator, it is impossible to trace any further
information. In regard to portable software discoverability,
the researchers stated that it was difficult to determine
portable web browser usage on a host machine. The majority
of these statements were made without the basis of
any true experimental findings. Therefore, every one
of these statements will be fully tested in our research
to determine authoritative answers. We plan to recover
significant residual artifacts located on host machines
testing several different portable web browsers. Even
though USB identifiers are important to obtain, it is
even more important to establish an affirmative link
between user and session.
3.3. Flash drive
In comparison to current portable software, Sandisk and
Microsoft worked together many years ago on a project
called U3 Technology [5]. Essentially, the idea was toallow consumers to carry a portable disk containing
personalized files and web browsers. U3 flash drives
were pre-installed with a U3 Launchpad, similar to an
OS start menu with various programs installed. There
are two partitions to the U3 flash drive structure: one is a
mass storage device and the other is a virtual CD-ROM.
The virtual partition was actually an ISO image, which was
why information was read but not written to the disk.
According to one study [6], U3 devices created a folder on
host machines and recorded user activity. Once the disk
was ejected, a cleanup program was executed and automat-
ically removed all user activity from that system. By
analyzing the Windows Prefetch files, researchers were able
to identify which programs were run from the U3 device.
In another study on battling U3 anti-forensics [7], U3
identifiers were discovered as well by analyzing the
Windows Registry and Prefetch directory. The majority of
traces were located within slack space and free space of
the hard drive. For this reason, our research experiments
will be conducted using separate physical hard drives to
incorporate the possibility of discovering data within these
areas. Even though sufficient evidence was obtained to
support which U3 programs were launched, it was still
extremely difficult for researchers to identify other
significant artifacts. We will probably face the same
barriers in our research. Overall, the U3 portable disk
provided a sense of privacy and personalization to users.
Over time, there had been numerous complaints about
U3 devices such as potential incompatibility and malware-
like behavior. SanDisk began phasing out support for U3
Technology in late 2009 [3] and the U3 disk has been
discontinued.
4. Major browsers and private browsing
In this section, we discuss four major web browsers and
their private browsing implementations.
4.1. Microsoft Internet Explorer
Microsoft Internet Explorer (IE) is one of the most
commonly used web browsers on Windows machines.
A list of areas where most IE web browsing artifacts
are located is as follows:
 Cookies (Index.dat)
 History (Index.dat)
 Registry (typed URLs, search queries, auto-complete,
protected storage)
 NTUSER.dat
 Temporary Internet Files and Index.dat Entries
 Downloads.
IE also offers users a private browsing feature called
InPrivate Browsing. According to Microsoft [8], InPrivate
Browsing enables users to surf the Internet without leaving
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Browsing, some information such as cookies and tempor-
ary files are temporarily stored so that web pages will work
correctly. Once the browsing session is ended, all of that
data is discarded. Table 2 shows a list of areas affected
by InPrivate Browsing and is available to the public
on Microsoft's webpage. In regard to web browser
extensions, IE disables all toolbars and extensions
during InPrivate Browsing sessions to ensure better
privacy. IE also does not clear toolbars and extensions
after a private session is ended.
4.2. Google chrome
Google Chrome is another very popular web browser
that can be found on both Windows and Mac operating
systems. A list of common areas where Chrome web
browsing artifacts can be located is as follows:
 JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) structure - text




 Keyword search terms
 Keywords
 URL database
 History index (YYY-MM)
 Current and last sessions
 Top sites database
 Media cache.
Chrome also offers something called Incognito mode
for users to browse the Internet in a private setting.
According to Google [9], Incognito mode does not
record any browsing or download histories, and all
created cookies will be removed when exiting a session
completely. Additionally, Google states that if users areTable 2 Microsoft IE InPrivate browsing features
Data How InPrivate browsing affects data
Cookies Contained in working memory but
cleared after session
Temporary internet files Stored on disk but deleted after
session
Webpage history Not stored
Form data and passwords Not stored
Anti-phishing cache Temporary information is encrypted
and stored
Address bar and auto-
complete
Not stored
Automatic cache restore Restore is successful only if tab crashes
and not entire session
Document object model
storage
Discarded after sessionworking in Chrome OS, surfing the Internet under
guest browsing essentially does the same thing. Once
the guest session is closed, all browsing information is
completely erased.
4.3. Mozilla Firefox
Mozilla Firefox is another popular web browser that can
be found on multiple platforms. Web browsers such as
Chrome and Firefox can also be found on mobile devices
such as Androids, iPads, etc. A list of common areas where
Firefox web browsing artifacts can be located is as follows:
 Sqlite database structure
 Prefs.js (user preferences)





 Places.sqlite (bookmarks and history)
 Downloads.sqlite.
Just like all other major web browsers, Firefox offers a
discreet browsing mode called Private Browsing. According
to Mozilla [10], Private Browsing mode allows users to surf
the Internet without saving any information about visited
sites or pages. Table 3 shows a list of areas affected by
Private Browsing and is available to the public on Mozilla's
webpage. Mozilla makes it clear that private browsing
modes do not make users anonymous from web sites,
ISP's, and networks. In other words, Private Browsing is
merely affected in the Application Layer recognized in the
OS. Aside from other privacy features, there is an option
to enable the Do-Not-Track feature in Firefox which
requests that websites do not track user browsing
behavior. This request is honored voluntarily and Apple
Safari offers the same. In the experimental phase of ourTable 3 Mozilla private browsing features
Data How private browsing affects data
Visited pages Will not be added in History menu,
Library history, or other bar list
Form and search bar entries Nothing entered will be saved for Form
Auto-complete
Passwords No new passwords will be saved
Download list entries No downloaded files will be listed under
Downloads
Cookies Does not save
Cached web content Not saved
Flash cookies Latest version of Flash must be used to
prevent saving
Offline web content and
user data
Not saved
Figure 1 PortableApps launchpad.
Figure 2 Hard drive setup with labels.
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privacy.4.4. Apple safari
The Apple Safari web browser is primarily used on
Mac/iOS operating systems but is also available for
Windows. A list of common areas where Safari web
browsing artifacts can be located is as follows:







Apple's latest version of the Safari web browser for
Windows is Safari 5.1.7 [11]. When Safari launched 6.0,
they did not update the Windows versions. Most people
have assumed that Apple is moving away from Windows
compatibility. According to Apple, Private Browsing mode
ensures that web pages are not added to the history list,
cookie changes are discarded, searches are not added tothe search fields, and websites cannot modify information
stored on the computer.5. Portable software
In this section, we discuss several major web browsers
that are made available in portable formats and were
used for this research.5.1. Portable application and web browsers
To allow for certain portable browsers to work, a free
program called PortableApps [12] was used for this
research. PortableApps is similar to the previously
mentioned U3 Launchpad in that it allows you to
take portable applications with you as you go. It is
based on an open source platform and will work with
almost any portable storage device. Figure 1 shows
how the launchpad is structured. In our study, the
application was installed on a USB flash drive. Three
portable web browsers were selected through PortableApps:
Mozilla Firefox Portable 18.0.1 [13], Google Chrome
Portable 24.0.1312.52 [14], and Opera Portable 12.12
[15]. The reason Apple Safari Portable was not selected
because it was not in fact portable. The most updated
version located was not a standalone executable program
and it had to be installed onto the machine. According
Figure 3 DaemonFS monitoring example.
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information behind on the machine it runs on [13].
All the portable browsers were essentially designed
for users to carry customized browsers without leaving
traces on machines. That is why artifacts, such as web
browsing history, passwords, and auto-fill forms, are stored
where the portable browser installation folder is located.
Privacy modes can also be enabled to help block flash
cookies and other artifacts from storing within the
installation folder.6. Implementations and experiments
In this section, we provide a brief overview of private
and portable web browsing sessions that will be analyzed
using computer forensics.6.1. Tools and setup
The following tools were used for the assessments,
acquisitions, examinations, and analysis:Table 4 Browser analysis during normal browsing sessions
Browser Primary changes
Internet explorer 8.0 Temp File Directory files (Con
created, modified, and delete
Google chrome 23.0.1271.95 Directory Chrome\User Data
Default\Session Storage) files
Firefox 17.0.1 Directory Firefox\Profiles (Cac
modified, and deleted
Safari 5.1.7 Directory AppleComputer\Sa
files are created, modified, anHardware
 1- Desktop (PC - forensic workstation - 4-GB RAM)
 1- Laptop (PC - forensic workstation - 6-GB RAM)
 8–160 GB SATA Hard Drives (one dedicated drive
for lab)
 1- USB Flash Drive (8 GB)
 1- USB External Drive (1 TB WD Passport)
 1- SATA to USB Adapter
 1- Tableau USB Write Blocker (IDE/SATA)
 Antistatic Bags and Antistatic Wrist Strap
Software
 Microsoft Windows 7 Professional (64)
 Internet Explorer, Firefox, Safari, Chrome
 VMware - virtualization software
 DaemonFS - file integrity monitoring program
 Disk Wipe - to replace data on disk with zeros
 Nirsoft Internet Tools - history, cache, and
cookie viewerstent.IE, History.IE5, Cookies, Recovery, Custom Destinations, Index.dat) are
d
(Safe Browsing Whitelist, Default\ Cache, Current Session, Default\History,
are created, modified, and deleted
he, jumpListCache, etc.) and Win CustomDestinations, files are created,
fari (Cache, History, Webpage Previews, Cookies, WebpageIcons.db)
d deleted
Table 5 Browser analysis during private browsing sessions
Private browser Noticeable change
IE InPrivate Browsing Everything gets deleted when exiting the browser and the entire session is terminated
Google Chrome Incognito Mode Safe Browsing databases, Cookies, and History are modified, no changes during session but the
chrome_shutdown_ms.txt is replaced with a new timestamp when session ends
Firefox Private Browsing Safe Browsing database gets modified, nothing appears to be written while surfing, but when
session ends, some Firefox\Profile files are modified
Safari Private Browsing Only NTuser.dat appears to be modified
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 PortableApps - portable application Launchpad
 Firefox Portable, Chrome Portable, Opera Portable
 FTK Imager - used to create forensic images
 FTK Imager Lite - portable version
 AccessData FTK version 3.2 (Licensed) - used to
analyze forensic images and organize information
The key to our research was for us to conduct a stan-
dardized test across multiple controlled environments.
Therefore, all the experiments were handled in a forensic-
ally sound manner as if we were handling real evidence.
Photographs were taken, forensic images were created,
procedures were properly documented, and evidence was
safely preserved.
We began by taking every hard drive and removing
residual data using Disk Wipe [16]. Each disk was
connected to a secondary forensic workstation (laptop)
through a SATA to USB Adapter. The Disk Wipe tool
provides several different wiping options and writes over
data with zeros. The first disk was tested by examining it
forensically after wiping it with only one pass. Since
there was some residual data that was found, a DoD
Algorithm was selected next to wipe the disk using three
passes; this method proved to be more efficient. After
every disk was successfully wiped, each one was installed
with Windows 7 Professional - 64 bits. The 64-bit
version was used so that more random-access memory
(RAM) could later be tested.
Next, each disk was installed with only one specific
Internet browser pre-loaded from an external hard drive,
except for the portable applications. The web browsers
installed were Microsoft Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox,
Apple Safari, and Google Chrome. Each browser was
configured to launch automatically into private browsingTable 6 Browser analysis using portable web browsers
Portable browser Host machine activity
Opera portable Temp files appear to be created on disk a
Firefox portable Mozilla\Roaming directory was modified,
Google chrome portable Folder called GoogleChromePortable had
and Portable Chrome Cache
Safari portable Setup files are portable but must be instamode except for Safari, which had to be done manually. It
is important to note, since prior research [1] showed
browser plug-ins and extensions to cause weakness to
private browsing sessions, none were installed. It is also
important to note that everything was pre-configured
before connecting to the Internet. Figure 2 shows the hard
drives being configured and labeled.
6.2. Preliminary analysis
While the disks were being properly developed, a baseline
was established using a laptop with VMware and a file
integrity monitoring program called DaemonFS [17]. This
assisted with having a general idea for which areas were
modified and accessed during normal, private, and
portable web browsing sessions. Once DaemonFS was
launched, it was set to monitor all activity within the
local hard drive (root). After the logical parameter
was set, each web browser was individually launched
and tested using a series of standardized steps. Figure 3
shows how the log is generated during activity. These
steps included article searches, image searches, video
searches, email account logins, bank account logins, and
online purchase attempts. See Tables 4, 5, and 6 for results.
6.3. Private ate browsing experiments
Author1 has a background in law enforcement and has
experience analyzing digital media for a vast array of
crimes. The Internet activities used for these experiments
were adapted from an abundance of information to include
past experience and knowledge. It is important to note that
these principles can still be applied to all aspects of
Internet forensics regardless of whether or not the scope
relates to a crime. These types of browsing sessions can
very well be conducted without any criminal intent. The
overall purpose of digital forensics is to help establish andnd then are deleted when session ends
and a few temp files under Local AppData were created/deleted
files created, modified, and deleted, including Sys32\Winevt\Logs,
lled on system (not standalone.exe) therefore will not be used for testing
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(person, place, or thing). By collecting and analyzing
enough data, evidentiary content can be produced.
To begin the main experiments, each disk was separately
utilized as a single primary drive. Every step was manually
recorded with timestamps for future reference points. For
the first four disks, only private browsing sessions were
tested using the installed web browsers. For the purpose of
these experiments, a ‘browsing session’ will refer to all
activity conducted on one specific web browser. Once a
private browsing session was launched, the same series of
steps were performed for each browser. Table 7 shows the
details of these standardized sessions.
After each browsing session was complete, the web
browser process tree was terminated (verified) and the
RAM was dumped into a file using FTK Imager Lite
(installed on USB). Not only was the memory dumped
but Registry files were obtained, the pagefile.sys was
extracted, and an .ad1 image file of the RAM was
created as well. The location of the RAM dump was stored
on the target machine's Desktop due to reasons that will
later be explained. This would probably not be preferred in
a real setting unless it was absolutely necessary. In any
event, it is always important to document the footprints
left behind on a live environment. Initially, the data was
extracted to an external hard drive. The machine was then
unplugged from the back and the disk was carefully
removed. As noted, a few extra things were done to
preserve sound results. The working memory was
dumped before and after every disk session, to ensure
that residual data was not left over in the RAM from
the session before. In addition, several Internet tools
from Nirsoft [18], such as cache viewer, history viewer,
and cookie viewer, were executed after each browsing
session was terminated and yielded negative results.
Meaning, nothing could be discovered using these tools
after private browsing sessions were used.Table 7 Internet sessions used for experiments
Website Standardized steps
Google Search for various images, sites, and forums targete
and images
Yahoo! Search for various sites and forums targeted for crim
YouTube Search for how-to videos on different types hacking (
Gmail Send email with attachments
Hotmail Send email with attachments
Yahoo! Mail Send email with attachments
SHSU Mail Send email with attachments
Online Banking Log into several accounts (stores cookies and certifi
Ammunition-to-Go Attempt to purchase large amounts (2,000+) of am
Online Firearms Store Search for high capacity magazines and various we
Craigslist Search for different types of items for sale that mig6.4. Portable browsing experiment
The next three disks were used in conjunction with
portable web browsers running from a USB flash drive.
The flash drive was installed with a program called
PortableApps. Essentially, PortableApps allows you to
run different programs from a flash drive similar to
an OS Start menu. After setting up the Launchpad, three
portable web browsers were installed on the flash drive:
Mozilla Firefox Portable, Google Chrome Portable, and
Opera Portable. Again, each hard disk was separately used
as a primary hard drive but this time without any other
web browsers installed. Each portable web browser was
individually launched while performing the same series of
standardized steps as the first four disks (Table 7).
Whenever a disk was complete, it was carefully placed into
an antistatic bag and into a cool dry place for storage. In
addition, an antistatic wrist band was used while handling
all internal electronic components.6.5. Forensic acquisition and analysis
The last hard disk was developed with Windows 7 and
FTK 3.2 to make it a dedicated computer forensic worksta-
tion. AccessData's Forensic Toolkit (FTK) [19] is a court ac-
cepted program used for examining computers and mobile
devices at the forensic level. Each disk was individually
connected to the Desktop using a hardware-based write
blocker (Tableau), to protect any data from being altered by
the computer. Digital evidence preservation is the most im-
portant factor next to chain of custody, when it comes to
forensic integrity. Using FTK Imager, a bit stream image of
each evidence disk was created as a compressed E01 image
file and was verified by several different hashes. Each image
took anywhere from 3 to 5 h to complete. Next, individual
images were forensically examined, analyzed, and classified
by FTK 3.2. One disk image took up to 72 h to process and
the disks with the installed browsers took the longest.d for criminal activity; click on top five links; save/download different files
inal activity; click on top five links; save/download available files
social media, bank accounts, and WiFi connections); click on links to open
cates)
munition (various high powered rounds) by searching and adding to cart
apons
ht be flagged as stolen
Table 8 Private web browsing artifacts





Y Memdump; Free/Slack Space (‘Start InPrivate Browsing’ - prior to URL history);
$I30 (…\Content.IE5- ‘inprivate [1]’- prior to list of *.jpeg's); Pagefile
Browsing history Y Memdump; Free space; File slack (Temporary Internet Folder, Roaming\…\Custom
Destinations); SysVol Info; $LogFile; $J; AppData\…\IE\Recovery\Active
Usernames/email
accounts
Y Memdump; Freespace; Temporary Internet Folder; User\AppData…\IE\Recovery
\Active






Y Memdump; Chrome\…\Installer\chrome.7z & chrome.dll (timestamp matches);
$I30 (safebrowsing timestamp) AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\chrome_
shutdown_ms.txt (always updates with timestamp); AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\
User Data\Default\Extension State\*.log (declarative_rules.incognito.declaritiveWeb
Request- timestamp matches session start); ~\SysVol Information (new incognito
window with timestamps); AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\Custom
Destinations (new incognito window with timestamps); Chrome\UserData\
Safebrowsingcookies.db (modified timestamp)










Y Memdump (browsing mode); SysVolume Information (Enter Private Browsing
and Window’s User listed below- file timestamp accurate)
Browsing history Y Memdump; Free space- AppData\…\Temp; Win\Prefetch (.rtf temp file download
discovered); AppData\…\Firefox\Profiles (blacklist.xml- matching timestamps);










Y Memdump; ~\SysVol Information (com.apple.Safari.PrivateBrowsing timestamp)
Browsing history Y Memdump; Free/Slack Space (URL History); AppData\Local\AppleComp\Safari\
WebpageIcons.db> > tables; AppData\Local\AppleComp\Safari\ (databases
timestamp updates); AppData\…\AppleComp\Safari & Preferences\(several *.




Images Y Carved from Memdump (Mostly partial images)
Videos N N/A
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additional refinements were selected to carve different
types of data and parse complex information. Once FTK
finished processing the evidence files, numerous hours
were spent sifting through the data. We found that it
was also beneficial to use a program called Live View
[20] to have a better understanding of the artifacts
found. Live View is an open source program that can
convert a raw image to a virtual disk. The disk must be
booted into safe mode for the virtual machine to work
correctly without having to activate Windows. By using
two screens simultaneously, one with a live virtualenvironment and the other with the forensic image in
FTK, it allowed us to fully grasp and understand the
connections. See Tables 8 and 9 for complete results.
6.6. Results analysis
Private browsing modes and portable web browsers do
in fact leave incriminating evidence, but it depends on
the browser. Some web browsers left enough information
to establish an affirmative link and some did not. Out of
the four major web browsers, Internet Explorer provided
the most residual artifacts but not where common
artifacts are typically sought. This was fairly consistent
Table 9 Portable web browsing artifacts
Artifacts Discovered Target Locations
Google chrome
portable - 24.0.1312.52
Browser indicators Y NTFS Allocated and Unallocated Space; Prefetch; Pagefile; Memdump; $Logfile;
Users\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations; ~\System
Volume Information; AppData\Local\Temp; AppData\LocLow\Mic\CryptnetUrlCache;
Win\AppCompat\Prog\RecentFileCache; Win\Mic.NET\Framework\log (fileslack);
Win\Sys32\LogFiles\WUDF\ (fileslack)




Y [Orphan] directory and NTFS Unallocated Free/Slack Space
Images Y Carved (NTFS Unallocated Space and Orphan Directory)
Videos N N/A
Opera portable - 12.12 Browser indicators Y NTFS Allocated and Unallocated Space; Pagefile; Memdump; $LogFile; ~\System Volume
Information; NTUSER.DAT; AppData\Local\Mic\Win\UsrClass.dat; Users\AppData\Roaming\
Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations (Carved .lnk); Win\Prefetch; Win\Sys32\
LogFiles\SQM\SQMLogger









Browser indicators Y Memdump; SysVol Information file timestamp (Firefox Portable appinfo)
Browsing history Y Memdump; SysVol Information (Email only)
Usernames/email
accounts
Y Memdump; SysVol Information (Email Account History)
Images Y Carved from Memdump (Mostly partial images and difficult to view full content)
Videos N N/A
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and Registry > TypedURLs were empty, but we were still
able to recover virtually all cached images, URL history,
and usernames with their associated accounts. Everything
was recoverable except for playable videos. Even though
most of the data was recovered from RAM, free space,
and slack space areas, there were sufficient findings within
allocated space as well. Figure 4 shows an ‘[InPrivate]’
indicator within RAM prior to an online search for hacking.
In regard to indicators, there were a few areas where
‘InPrivate’ and ‘Start InPrivate Browsing’ were noted
prior to a URL history log. Figure 5 shows one of these
indicators within allocated space. It was also noted that
the Microsoft ‘PrivacIE’ directory was found empty.
The three remaining browsers were a little more difficult
to recover residual artifacts from. It appeared that the
overall best way to recover residual data was to obtain the
evidence from RAM or working memory, but that is notFigure 4 [InPrivate] search for ‘how + to + hack +…’ within RAM (Hexalways possible for investigators. For Google Chrome
Incognito artifacts, there were many browsing indicators
and changes in timestamps to show Chrome usage. However,
it was difficult to establish an affirmative link between the
user and session because none of the usernames and other
historical information was accessible; the same resulted for
Mozilla Firefox. In both of these cases, any documents that
were temporarily opened from the Internet were recoverable.
This information is important because browsing indicators
along with timestamps may be able to explain why
something like as URL history is not there. For example, if
a live search using regular expressions was used to locate
one of these hidden artifacts in an unfamiliar location, an
investigator can now understand why they were not found
in other common areas.
Apple Safari seemed to fall in the middle by keeping
most things private while still leaving traces on the
machine. The easiest way to view the browsing historyview).
Figure 5 InPrivate indicator in FTK.
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‘WebpageIcons’ database under Safari artifacts. This database
provided a good log of every visited URL along with other
pertinent information. Figure 6 shows some of the database
artifacts using FTK. It is important to realize that this
can be used to explain to courts as to why URL history
would be located here and nowhere else under Safari data.
It is not always about what is present, but what is absent
is also of value.
With regard to residual portable browsing artifacts, it
appeared that everything was just as easily obtained
from the memory dumps as it was with the installed
browsers. However, not everything was located on the
target hard drives. Out of the three portable web
browsers tested, Google Chrome Portable left the most
residual artifacts on the host machine. The recovery
seemed as if Chrome was installed on the machine itself.
Almost all artifacts to include images, browsing history,
browsing method, and usernames with associated accounts,
were located on the disk. Also note, these recovered
artifacts were obtained without the flash drive. The
importance for an investigator to distinguish that these
artifacts came from Google Chrome Portable is for two
reasons: (a) to be able to explain why Chrome artifacts
were not located under common areas and (b) to alert the
investigator that further evidence may be found on a flashFigure 6 Safari WebpageIcons database.drive that the investigator did not originally consider.
Figure 7 provides a comparison of all the browsers
tested and the strength of evidence which can be found.
Opera Portable, on the other hand, did not leave as
much information as Chrome. There were many portable
browsing indicators but most history artifacts were
limited; none of the usernames or accounts could be
recovered. Firefox Portable resulted in similar findings;
however, some user activity was found to be recoverable.
All of the usernames associated with their respected email
accounts were recovered along with Firefox browsing
indicators.
In reference to carved images from RAM, most of
them were distorted but a few of the images could be
seen as a whole. One solution was to try and match a
distorted image from RAM with a whole image on the
hard drive using FTK's fuzzy hash option. This would be
a great way to link carved contraband to working memory
artifacts and therefore strengthening evidence against the
user. The program attempts to match files by determining
a fundamental level of similarity between hashes. This
method did not always work as hoped. Some of the
thumbnails stored in RAM were successfully matched
with ones on the disk but none specific to user activity.
Perhaps on a machine with a much higher capacity of
RAM, this would be more useful.
Figure 7 Web browsers - strength of residual evidence.
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Aside from discovering hidden web browsing artifacts,
there is another finding worth mentioning due to its
significant linking of users and machines. Every time the
external hard drive (WD Passport) was connected to
one of the machines via USB, not only did it leave
unique identifiers but also a log of every folder located
on the Passport. This information was transferred
directly to the Windows machine while remaining on
the hard drive and RAM. For this reason, a flash drive
was later used to dump the memory on the Desktop to
preserve data integrity without further contamination.
The Passport files were discovered within several different
locations on the hard drive. One was within a log file called
the Circular Kernal Context Logger (BootCKCL.etl),
and the other was within Trace*.fx files. Most prob-
ably the reason for the Trace*.fx files was due to the
activity of a USB device configured for ReadyBoost
(virtual memory).
This finding raises a number of questions and concerns.
An investigator can easily document certain footprints
such as plugging in devices and checking running
processes. It is the unknown footprints which can
cause a problem. This could violate certain policy and
procedures that were once considered forensically
sound. On the other hand, it could provide an investigator
with enough information to understand that the file paths
may be pointing to an external device. So not only will
information from the Registry provide unique identifiers
but this could also be used to know what type of
contraband may be on the ‘missing evidence.’ This informa-
tion would be extremely helpful when trying to establish an
affirmative link between user and target machine.
7. Future work
Future work may include further RAM experiments,
and more efficient methods to extract informationover an extended period of time instead of one con-
trolled browsing session. In addition, forensic tools or
carving options may be developed to provide investi-
gators with whether or not these browsing artifacts
exist (0/1 = False/Positive), and parse these artifacts
accordingly.
8. Conclusion
The majority of recovered artifacts were discovered in
RAM, slack/free space, and FTK [Orphan] directories.
That being said, information was still obtained within
allocated space. Another commonality between the
browsers was information contained within the System
Volume Information directory. The bottom line is that
our research clearly establishes authoritative answers to
which were never there before. In addition, some of our
authoritative results contradict prior research statements.
For example, one study [2] made the statement that it
would be impossible to trace residual information, other
than USB identifiers, if a portable storage device was not
accessible to the investigator. Our research clearly shows
that further data can still be recovered on host machines
without the portable storage device being present. Overall,
our research is a valuable resource pertaining to private
and portable web browsing artifacts. Not every web browser
will leave incriminating evidence but some will, depending
on the situation. These residual artifacts may or may not be
important to a case, but on the other hand it may be
the only way to explain certain results. Computer
forensic investigators must treat digital environments
like a real crime scene. It is not only important to
document what is found but to also note what is not
there and ask why. Our research now provides an alter-
native way to perceive these types of findings and
explain the results. We conclude that just because
something is not there does not mean it never
happened.
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